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FAILURE OF CALIBRATION IS TYPICAL
GORDON BELOT
Abstract. Schervish (1985b) showed that every forecasting system is noncal-
ibrated for uncountably many data sequences that it might see. This result
is strengthened here: from a topological point of view, failure of calibration
is typical and calibration rare. Meanwhile, Bayesian forecasters are certain
that they are calibrated—this invites worries about the connection between
Bayesianism and rationality.
1. Introduction
Consider a context in which Nature presents us with an infinite binary sequence,
one bit at a time. A probabilistic forecasting system is a function that takes as input
finite binary strings (records of data seen to date) and gives as output numbers in
the unit interval (the forecast probability that the next bit seen will be a one).
Following custom, we specialize to the case of weather forecasting systems: the
data sequences encode, for each of some sequence of days, whether or not it snows
in a given locale on that day (1=snow; 0=no snow); each day, the forecasting system
is asked to output a probability for snow on that day, given the pattern of snowy
and snowless days in the extant data set.
Notation. We denote data sequences by a=(a1, a2, a3, . . . ) and the probability
output by a forecaster on day k, based on knowledge of a1, . . . ak−1, by pik. We call
dk = ak − pik the forecaster’s discrepancy on day k.
Motivated rivals of a forecaster will keep an eye on long-term behaviour of the
forecaster’s mean discrepancy—if this quantity does not tend to zero when spe-
cialized to days of a given type (all days, even-numbered days, days on which the
forecast probability exceeds .9, . . . ) then the forecaster can be discredited as being
systematically excessively optimistic or pessimistic concerning the chance of snow
on such days (or, possibly, as oscillating permanently between excessive pessimism
and optimism).
This motivates the following definitions (Dawid, 1985b, §5). A selection rule δ
is a function that takes as input a forecasting system F and a data sequence a
and gives as output a subsequence of the sequence of days—with whether or not
day k appears in the subsequence δ(F,a) depending only on a1, . . . ak−1 and on
the forecast probability pik for day k. A forecaster F is calibrated for data sequence
a with respect to selection rule δ if the mean discrepancy tends to zero when one
specializes to the days picked out by δ(F,a) (or if there are only finitely many such
days).
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Each set of selection rules determines a notion of calibration. Here we will just
need to mention two, the first very stringent indeed, the other so weak that it will
be implied by just about any interesting notion of calibration. (i) A forecasting
system is computably calibrated for data sequence a if it is calibrated for a relative
to each computable selection rule. (ii) A forecasting system is high-low calibrated
for data sequence a if it is calibrated relative to the rule that selects those days on
which pik ≥ .5 and the rule that selects those days on which pik < .5.
It is natural to ask whether there exist forecasting systems that are calibrated
(in one or another sense) for each possible data sequence. Answer: there is no
forecasting system that is even high-low calibrated for every possible data sequence
(Oakes, 1985; Dawid, 1985a). Fix a forecasting system and think of Nature as an
adversary aiming to spoil the forecaster’s high-low calibration. Nature can achieve
this by basing the weather each day on the forecast probability of snow, making
the day snowy if and only if the forecast probability is less than .5.1
Schervish (1985b) showed more: every forecasting system fails to be high-low
calibrated relative to an uncountable infinity of possible data sequences; indeed
there are uncountably many data sequences with the feature that each computable
forecasting method fails to be high-low calibrated relative to each one of them. He
concluded that “noncalibrability is as much the normal state as calibrability.”
One way to build a forecasting system is to choose a prior over the space of
binary sequences, and to use a Bayesian agent who conditionalizes that prior on
finite data sets to output the desired probabilities. Dawid (1982, 1985b) proved that
every such Bayesian forecasting system is supremely confident of its own calibration:
every prior on the space of binary sequences considers the set of sequences relative
to which it is not computably calibrated to be a set of measure zero. Dawid
(1985b, Note 7.3) saw in this a reply to Schervish: there remains an intuitive sense
in which those sequences for which no computable forecasting system is high-low
calibrated must be sparse—since they are, collectively, assigned measure zero by
any computable Bayesian forecasting system.
Now, it is a familiar point that there are uncountable subsets of the real line
that are nonetheless small or sparse in an interesting sense: the ternary Cantor
set, for instance, is uncountable but is a set of Lebesgue measure zero and is also
meagre (negligible from the topologists’ point of view). One purpose of the present
note is to extend Schervish’s result (and to undercut Dawid’s response) by showing
that if we consider topology rather than just cardinality, then the parity between
calibration and noncalibration is broken: each forecasting system is fails to be high-
low calibrated relative to typical data sequences—and typical data sequences have
the feature that no computable forecasting system is high-low calibrated for them.
Another purpose is to return with these results in mind to a question raised by
Dawid (1982, §6)—Is it really rational for Bayesian forecasters to be certain that
they are calibrated?
1What if we allow the forecaster to play a mixed strategy, randomly selecting on each day a
deterministic forecasting scheme whose forecast to follow? In itself, this will make no difference—
all that Nature cares about is the forecast probability output each day (Foster and Vohra, 1998,
§3). But there are some interesting variants of our game that forecasters playing mixed strategies
can win: see, e.g., Foster and Vohra (1998), Vovk et al. (2005), and V’yugin (2009).
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2. Meagre and Residual Sets and the Banach–Mazur Game
In a probability space, the notions of sets of measure zero and sets of measure one
give us natural ways of making precise the notions of sets so small as to be ignorable
and of overwhelmingly large sets. In a topological space, the corresponding notions
are as follows: a subset Y of a topological space X is meagre (or first category)
if can be written as Y =
⋃∞
k=1 Yk, where each Yk is nowhere dense in X (i.e., the
closure of each Yk in X has empty interior); the complement of a meagre subset of
a topological space X is called residual.
Taking as our prototype the notion of a countable subset of the real line, it
is natural to think that any class of ‘small’ subsets of a given space should be
closed under taking subsets and countable unions. And it is natural to count a
nowhere dense subset Y of a topological space X as small. This motivates the
practice of topologists of treating properties as typical (rare) if they correspond to
residual (meagre) subsets of a well-behaved space of interest. Thus, it is often said
that typical continuous functions are nowhere differentiable because the set of such
functions forms a residual subset of the space of continuous functions.
The Banach–Mazur game provides a convenient alternative characterization of
meagre sets. Let X be a topological space and let G be an open basis for the
topology of X. Let a subset A of X be selected. A game is to be played. Player
1 and Player 2 will alternate taking turns picking elements G1, G2, G3, . . . of G.
The first move of Player 1 is unconstrained; but each subsequent Gk+1 must be a
subset of Gk. Player 1 wins if A has nonempty intersection with
⋂∞
k=1Gk. Otherwise
Player 2 wins. Oxtoby (1957) shows that A is meagre in X if and only if Player 2
has a winning strategy—no matter what Player 1 does, Player 2 can always win.
3. Noncalibration is Typical
For our forecasting systems, the space of possible data sequences is just the
Cantor space C—the space of infinite binary sequences. As a product space, this
space has a natural topology: the topology of pointwise convergence. An open basis
for this topology is given by the sets of the following form: for any finite binary
string w, Bw is the set of binary sequences that have w as an initial segment.
Proposition. Let M be a forecasting system. Then relative to typical data sequences
in C, M fails to be high-low calibrated.
Proof. Let A be the set of data sequences for which M is high-low calibrated. We
aim to show that A is meagre in C. To this end, we consider the Banach–Mazur
game for A ⊂ C, relative to the open basis for the topology of C consisting of sets
of the form Bw (w a finite binary string). So Player 1 and Player 2 take turns
playing binary strings, with with Player 1 winning if the sequence that results from
concatenating the strings played lies in A, Player 2 winning otherwise.
We need to show that Player 2 has a winning strategy. Here is how it works.
Every time it is Player 2’s turn, she plays a binary string, each bit of which is
chosen to frustrate M—if Player 2 is playing the kth bit overall, then she plays a 1
if pik < .5, otherwise she plays a 0 for that bit. No matter what Player 1 has already
done, by doing this for long enough, Player 2 can ensure that either: (i) the mean
discrepancy for days on which the forecast probability is less than .5 is at least .25;
or (ii) the mean discrepancy for days on which the forecast probability is at least .5
is less than −.25. Once she achieves one or the other of these objectives, she ends
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her turn. No matter how Player 1 plays, the infinite sequence a that results has the
feature that it is fails to be calibrated either for the subsequence of days on which
the forecast probability is less than .5 or for the subsequence of days on which the
forecast probability is at least .5 (since at least (i) or (ii) must be achieved infinitely
often by Player 2). Thus Player 2 has a winning strategy.
So M fails to be high-low calibrated for typical data sequences. Further, since
the intersection of countably many residual sets is residual, and since there are
only countably many computable forecasting systems, we see that typical data
sequences have the feature that each computable forecasting system fails to be
high-low calibrated for each of them.
4. Rationality, Calibration, and Arrogance
Agents obeying the dictates of Bayesianism tend to be supremely self-confident.
Consider the problem of reconstructing the i.i.d. probabilities governing a chance
mechanism from knowledge of longer and longer finite sequences of its outputs. A
Bayesian will posit a prior µ on the space Θ of parameter values under consideration,
then update by conditionalization. Each prior assigns measure one to the subset of
Θ consisting of those θ at which it is consistent (i.e., those θ such that the posterior
probabilities resulting from conditionaliztion converge to a point mass at θ, with
θ-probability one). But these sets need not be small in any intuitive sense. Indeed,
Freedman (1963, 1965) showed that when the chance process under consideration
has a countable infinity of possible outcomes, typical priors fail to be consistent
at typical θ—although tail-free priors are consistent at every θ. It is often thought
that there is a moral here: Bayesians should not settle for subjective certainty of
success—priors inconsistent for vast swathes of possibilities should be viewed with
suspicion.
The situation is a little worse with our forecasting problem: we again find that
Bayesian agents are subjectively certain of success (i.e., of calibration)—but now
we find that each and every one of them is typically unsuccessful. If we are to view
poorly behaved priors with suspicion, then every prior is under a cloud.
There is no special problem here for a pragmatic Bayesian statistician—the no-
tion of calibration is remote from practical questions (Schervish, 1985a). But in
some corners, at least, enthusiasm persists for the idea that rationality dictates that
agents should have coherent subjective probabilities that they update by condition-
alization. On this understanding, rationality requires that we should be certain that
we will be successful at certain tasks, even when we know that, among the possi-
bilities under consideration, those at which we succeed are rare and those at which
we fail are typical.
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